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Merge pull request #43977 from Ch3LL/3.8_sec

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Add Security Notes to 2016.3.8 Release Notes
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garethgreenaway 2017-10-09 10:20:30 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
commit bd73dcb02c
2 changed files with 33 additions and 18 deletions
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22
doc/topics/releases/2016.3.8.rst
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@ -7,23 +7,9 @@ Version 2016.3.8 is a bugfix release for :ref:`2016.3.0 <release-2016-3-0>`.
Changes for v2016.3.7..v2016.3.8
--------------------------------
New master configuration option `allow_minion_key_revoke`, defaults to True. This option
controls whether a minion can request that the master revoke its key. When True, a minion
can request a key revocation and the master will comply. If it is False, the key will not
be revoked by the msater.
Security Fix
============
New master configuration option `require_minion_sign_messages`
This requires that minions cryptographically sign the messages they
publish to the master. If minions are not signing, then log this information
at loglevel 'INFO' and drop the message without acting on it.
CVE-2017-14695 Directory traversal vulnerability in minion id validation in SaltStack. Allows remote minions with incorrect credentials to authenticate to a master via a crafted minion ID. Credit for discovering the security flaw goes to: Julian Brost (julian@0x4a42.net)
New master configuration option `drop_messages_signature_fail`
Drop messages from minions when their signatures do not validate.
Note that when this option is False but `require_minion_sign_messages` is True
minions MUST sign their messages but the validity of their signatures
is ignored.
New minion configuration option `minion_sign_messages`
Causes the minion to cryptographically sign the payload of messages it places
on the event bus for the master. The payloads are signed with the minion's
private key so the master can verify the signature with its public key.
CVE-2017-14696 Remote Denial of Service with a specially crafted authentication request. Credit for discovering the security flaw goes to: Julian Brost (julian@0x4a42.net)

29
doc/topics/releases/2016.3.9.rst Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
===========================
Salt 2016.3.9 Release Notes
===========================
Version 2016.3.9 is a bugfix release for :ref:`2016.3.0 <release-2016-3-0>`.
Changes for v2016.3.7..v2016.3.9
--------------------------------
New master configuration option `allow_minion_key_revoke`, defaults to True. This option
controls whether a minion can request that the master revoke its key. When True, a minion
can request a key revocation and the master will comply. If it is False, the key will not
be revoked by the msater.
New master configuration option `require_minion_sign_messages`
This requires that minions cryptographically sign the messages they
publish to the master. If minions are not signing, then log this information
at loglevel 'INFO' and drop the message without acting on it.
New master configuration option `drop_messages_signature_fail`
Drop messages from minions when their signatures do not validate.
Note that when this option is False but `require_minion_sign_messages` is True
minions MUST sign their messages but the validity of their signatures
is ignored.
New minion configuration option `minion_sign_messages`
Causes the minion to cryptographically sign the payload of messages it places
on the event bus for the master. The payloads are signed with the minion's
private key so the master can verify the signature with its public key.