Merge pull request #44010 from Ch3LL/2016.3.7_follow_up

Security Fixes for 2016.3.8
This commit is contained in:
Nicole Thomas 2017-10-10 16:05:00 -04:00 committed by GitHub
commit 64fd839377
5 changed files with 39 additions and 11 deletions

View file

@ -577,6 +577,9 @@ class AsyncAuth(object):
log.warning('SaltReqTimeoutError: {0}'.format(e))
raise tornado.gen.Return('retry')
raise SaltClientError('Attempt to authenticate with the salt master failed with timeout error')
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
log.error('Sign-in attempt failed: %s', payload)
raise tornado.gen.Return(False)
if 'load' in payload:
if 'ret' in payload['load']:
if not payload['load']['ret']:

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@ -499,6 +499,17 @@ class TCPReqServerChannel(salt.transport.mixins.auth.AESReqServerMixin, salt.tra
'payload and load must be a dict', header=header))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
try:
id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')
if '\0' in id_:
log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)
stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
except TypeError:
log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)
stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
# intercept the "_auth" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know
# anything about our key auth
if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':

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@ -593,6 +593,17 @@ class ZeroMQReqServerChannel(salt.transport.mixins.auth.AESReqServerMixin, salt.
stream.send(self.serial.dumps('payload and load must be a dict'))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
try:
id_ = payload['load'].get('id', '')
if '\0' in id_:
log.error('Payload contains an id with a null byte: %s', payload)
stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id contains a null byte'))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
except TypeError:
log.error('Payload contains non-string id: %s', payload)
stream.send(self.serial.dumps('bad load: id {0} is not a string'.format(id_)))
raise tornado.gen.Return()
# intercept the "_auth" commands, since the main daemon shouldn't know
# anything about our key auth
if payload['enc'] == 'clear' and payload.get('load', {}).get('cmd') == '_auth':

View file

@ -485,22 +485,15 @@ def clean_path(root, path, subdir=False):
return ''
def clean_id(id_):
'''
Returns if the passed id is clean.
'''
if re.search(r'\.\.{sep}'.format(sep=os.sep), id_):
return False
return True
def valid_id(opts, id_):
'''
Returns if the passed id is valid
'''
try:
return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_)) and clean_id(id_)
except (AttributeError, KeyError) as e:
if any(x in id_ for x in ('/', '\\', '\0')):
return False
return bool(clean_path(opts['pki_dir'], id_))
except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError):
return False

View file

@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ class TestVerify(TestCase):
opts = {'pki_dir': '/tmp/whatever'}
self.assertFalse(valid_id(opts, None))
def test_valid_id_pathsep(self):
'''
Path separators in id should make it invalid
'''
opts = {'pki_dir': '/tmp/whatever'}
# We have to test both path separators because os.path.normpath will
# convert forward slashes to backslashes on Windows.
for pathsep in ('/', '\\'):
self.assertFalse(valid_id(opts, pathsep.join(('..', 'foobar'))))
def test_zmq_verify(self):
self.assertTrue(zmq_version())